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1.	  Introduction	  
The relation between humans and non-human animals, especially the ethical side of it, has been of 
interest to me for some years and I have read a few books on the topic. While reading about ancient 
views and treatises on the conception of animals and our relation to them last summer, I was 
intrigued by what appeared to be yet another interesting divergence between master and pupil in 
ancient Greece. While Aristotle, famously, is said to have stated that ”Plato is dear to me, but dearer 
still is truth” before launching an attack on one of the doctrines of Plato1, who had been Aristotle's 
teacher, I thought I had stumbled across another occurrence where this statement could more or less 
be applied. Interestingly enough, Aristotle was now the master who may have been mastered by his 
own pupil and successor as the head of Aristotle's school, Theophrastus. 
 
In Richard Sorabji's interesting book, Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the 
Western Debate, he claims that Aristotle denies the faculty of reason to animals and that this gave 
birth to an intellectual crisis: 
 
If animals are to be denied reason (logos), and with it belief (doxa), then their perceptual 
content must be compensatingly expanded, to enable them to find their way around in the world. 
On the other hand, it must not be expanded in such a way that perception becomes tantamount 
to belief. The distinction between these was as much debated then as it is now. It is not only 
perception that will need to be distinguished from belief, but the possession of concepts, 
memory, intention, emotion and speech, if these too can be found in animals that lack belief. 
(Sorabji, 2001, p.7) 
 
Granted that this is correct, it surely seems troublesome to have one model of explaining these 
mental abilities for humans and another, different, for animals. For although Ockham's razor2 was 
not invented by then, the rationale of it should be valid regardless of time. Therefore it was 
interesting to later in the book find out that Aristotle's perhaps most prominent student, 
Theophrastus, might have ascribed to animals further intellectual capacities than Aristotle did. The 
exact extent might not be very clear but Sorabji wrote that: 
 
                                                
1 Though Aristotle perhaps never expressed himself in this way, thereby making this ”quotation” reasonably 
disputable, it is clear that this is the meaning of the passage in the Nichomachean Ethics (NE 1.6, 1096a11-17). 
2 Devised by William of Ockham in the 14th-century, Ockhams razor is a principle used in problem solving and for 
deciding between competing hypotheses which stresses that ceteris paribus (all other things being equal), the 
hypothesis or solution with the fewest assumptions should be preferred. 
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Theophrastus is recorded by Porphyry as saying that animals engage in reasonings (logismoi). 
This claim, which is not qualified with an “as if”, appears to be Theophrastus', not Porphyry's. 
(Sorabji, 2001, p.45) 
 
How can one engage in reasonings without having reason? Theophrastus here appeared to me to 
enable himself to use the same model for both humans and animals. He would thereby set himself 
in a great position to stress differences of degree in reason for different species (as many do today) 
as an explanation for the differing abilities. This could then shred Aristotle's animal model to pieces 
with the aid of the razor supplied, posthumously to Theophrastus, by Ockham. 
 
Is this a reasonable interpretation? Do Theophrastus actually diverge from his master as suggested? 
If so, was Theophrastus' account superior to Aristotle's? 
 
1.1	  Aims	  and	  method	  
After introducing the Aristotelian concept of what a soul is and thereby setting the framework for 
my topic, I will start by explaining and giving an account of Aristotle's view on how humans and 
animals manage to experience and navigate in the world and whether he actually denies non-human 
animals of reason. 
 
Then I will examine Theophrastus' view. Does it diverge from Aristotle’s and did he attribute 
reason to animals or not? Is there perhaps even ground for judging Theophrastus' view as 
more ”Aristotelian” than Aristotle's own? 
 
I will also try to assess which is the most plausible view from different perspectives. The 
perspectives will be: (1) Are they coherent and plausible within each philosopher's system as a 
whole?  (2) Which is the most reasonable view from a contemporary (that is ancient) 
naturalistic/scientific perspective? 
 
1.2	  Problems	  and	  limitations	  of	  the	  material	  at	  hand	  
As with many of ancient writers, time has taken its toll and there are many of Theophrastus' works 
that have been lost. The perhaps most important passages for the topic at hand are believed to have 
been written by Theophrastus in his now lost work On piety. Fortunately there are fragments of this 
work preserved in Porphyry's On abstinence from animal food (referred to below by its Latin title 
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De abstinentia) where Porphyry reports what Theophrastus wrote. Quotes and reports from ancient 
sources are however often a little tricky to interpret as they are not seldom blended with the 
reporters' own view and terminology. Porphyry is no exception here and this will also be evident 
below. Despite this it seems plausible enough to accept that the general points of the passages that 
are said to come from Theophrastus actually originate from him. 
 
With Aristotle it is different. Although it is said that most of his works are lost, there is still an 
extraordinary corpus preserved and it is rather hard to find something that there is not a preserved 
Aristotelian text that treat. For the topic at hand there are several works that are relevant and they 
are all available, in multiple languages, as well. The authenticity of the book is solid and they are all 
thought to actually come from the mind and hands of Aristotle. There is however one exception and 
that is History of Animals. That work’s authenticity is contested and therefore I do not put a lot of 
weight on it. 
 
1.3	  Abbreviations	  
The Aristotelian titles will be written with their common abbreviations in the text and below is a list 
of them. 
 
DA – On the Soul (De anima) 
EE – Eudemian Ethics 
HA – History of Animals 
GA – Generation of Animals 
Metaph. – Metaphysics 
NE – Nichomachean Ethics 
PA – On the Parts of Animals 
Pol. – Politics 
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2.	  Aristotle	  
In his influential work On the Soul (more often referred to by its Latin title, De anima), Aristotle 
sets out to explain the soul (ψυχή). For Aristotle, a soul is like a blueprint or a principle of what a 
being is and souls in general can be equated to different principles of life, which can pretty 
accurately be compared to DNA, where every species (and individual) has a fixed development or 
potential upon creation. All living things have souls and every individual has a specific soul that 
makes it unique. Socrates had a soul which was unique in the way that no other man had the same 
set of abilities and memories, but at the same time his soul had quite a lot of features that were 
shared by other living creatures and that creates the opportunity for classification. What is it that 
constitutes the soul of an animal? What features are required to qualify a creature as a human? 
 
The Aristotelian soul can be seen as a collection of potentialities. Souls that have some crucial 
shared potentialities can be said to be of the same species. This makes it possible to talk of entities 
like for example the human soul. Although no one has the exact human soul there should be plenty 
of individuals that have exactly those qualifying potentialities that constitute a human soul and then 
has quite a few more along with that. It might be a shared human potential to have the potential of 
acquiring and using a language. However which language will differ among individuals and there 
might even be a few that do not learn any languages at all (though they have the potential) due to 
unfortunate circumstances but that would not make them less human. 
 
According to Aristotle there are three types of souls: plant souls, animal souls and human souls. All 
types of souls have nutritive potency (i.e. being able to take in nutriment and to grow) and that is 
where it stops for plant souls. In addition to nutritive potency one can also find potency in all 
animals for perception (at least one sense, often more) and for desiring (includes appetite, 
spiritedness and wishing. Most animals also have the ability to move from place to place and some 
(humans) have the power of thought or reason (διανοητικόν) and intellect (νοῦς). 
 
2.1	  Non-­‐human	  animals	  lack	  reason	  and	  intellect	  
After having concluded that taking in nutriment and being able to grow is shared among plants, 
animals and humans alike, Aristotle the Nichomachean Ethics clearly stated that: 
 
ἑποµένη δὲ αἰσθητική τις ἂν εἴη, φαίνεται δὲ καὶ αὐτὴ κοινὴ καὶ ἵππῳ καὶ βοῒ καὶ παντὶ 
ζῴῳ. λείπεται δὴ πρακτική τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος (NE, 1098a3-4) 
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Next to consider would be some sort of perception, but this too is evidently shared, by horses, 
oxen and every other animal. There remains a practical sort of life of what possesses reason 
(Trans. Rowe, 2002) 
 
The word for reason, λόγον, is here distinguished as what separates man from animal. The same 
word (λόγος) is central in a passage in Aristotle's Politics where the power of speech (also λόγον) 
paired with the ability to make value judgments is the foundation for the community of man. It is 
here written that: 
 
οὐθὲν γάρ, ὡς φαµέν, µάτην ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ: λόγον δὲ µόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζῴων (Pol. 
1253a9-10) 
 
Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal whom she has 
endowed with the gift of speech. (Trans. Jowett, 1885) 
 
While this might seem like clear evidence that Aristotle denied reason to animals, it can be tempting 
to explain the denial of reason to animals as serving a practical purpose rather than actually denying 
them reason. After all, ethics and politics are about practical matters for humans and how we ought 
to act, so there could be room for accepting lesser accuracy on what animals really are like. 
Interestingly enough, one can find hints of this being more than a practical, and somewhat 
inaccurate, notion in his naturalistic and psychological treatises. Thought and intellect are also 
mentioned as uniquely human features in the De anima, where Aristotle, after a few sentences in 
which common animal features (shared by both animals and man) are listed, states the following: 
 
ἐνίοις δὲ πρός τούτοις ὑπάρχει καὶ τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινητικόν, ἑτέροις δὲ καὶ τὸ διανοητικόν τε 
καὶ νοῦς, οἶον ἀνθρώποις καὶ εἵ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἤ τιµιώτερον. (DA 2.3, 414b16-19) 
 
In addition to these things, mobility with respect to place also belongs to some animals, and to 
others the power of thought and an intellect as well, namely to human beings (and anything else 
there may be that is similar or more worthy of honor). (Trans. Shiffman, 2011) 
 
Again, intellectual capacity is highlighted as the differentia3 for being human rather than any other 
                                                
3 Aristotle famously strove toward classifying everything properly and, perhaps somewhat naively, seemed to believe 
that classification could be done properly by finding the correct branches between one class of things/beings and 
another. These branches consist of some feature that one species has whereas another lacks, and it is these features 
that are referred to as differentia, i.e. the difference between one class of things/beings and another. 
8 
animal species (although gods perhaps share these intellectual capacities as well). This time though, 
the intellectual capacities mentioned is thought (διανοητικόν) and intellect (νοῦς). These passages 
are by no means the only ones that deny intellectual capacities to animals. For example, reason 
(λόγος) is denied to animals in multiple works4, reasoning (λογισµός)5, thought (διάνοια)6 and 
intellect (νοῦς)7 elsewhere too. With respect to the teleological worldview of Aristotle, where 
everything has a purpose and an end to strive for, which, when reached, results in the individual's 
full blossoming, should come as no surprise. This blossoming is, for humans, the state that is 
explained as happiness (εὐδαιµονία) in his ethics. And to reach this extraordinary state will require 
of us that we reach and practice the full potential of our distinctively human abilities – the 
intellectual ones. 
 
A striking fact about those passages is that there seems to be many different words for more or less 
the same thing. What is the difference between reason and intellect for example? It is not very 
obvious and is worth some explanation. Actually we cannot really make much sense in the 
discussion below without clarifying some terms. 
 
According to Aristotle, animals (at least some) are sensible (φρονεῖν) (DA 3.3, 427b8) and have the 
ability to get impressions/perceive (αἴσθησις) and to move. In addition to these all animals have the 
ability for imagination (φαντασία). Some animals also have the ability to store impressions, i.e. 
memory (µνήµῃ), which is why they are capable of having experience to guide their actions. These 
mental capacities are what animals are said to have. In addition to these, humans have reason 
(λόγος), which can be explained as a sort of calculating device, and intellect (νοῦς) which is the 
ability to grasp abstract concepts and forms, i.e. the intelligibles (νοητά). 
 
Aristotle distinguished four types of intellectual virtues, all of whom animals are unable to have 
because of being denied reason: 
1.) σοφία  = Abstract reasoning about universal truths where intellect and reason is required. 
2.) ἐπιστήµη  = Scientific knowledge. 
3.) τέχνη  = Best translated as craftsmanship. 
4.) φρόνησις  = Practical (ethical) wisdom, where reason is required to judge and guide the  
      individual about and what to do (praxis). 
                                                
4 DA 3.3, 428a24; EE 2.8, 1224a27; Pol. 7.13, 1332b5; NE 1098a3-4. 
5 DA 3.10, 433a12 
6 PA 1.1, 641b8-9 
7 DA 1.2, 404b4-6 
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It is not obvious why animals cannot have at least some of these intellectual virtues. What about a 
skilled predator who has surely mastered the way of catching its prey? Why should the hunting 
animal not count as having the τέχνη of hunting when a human hunter will not be denied this? And 
what about animals living in packs, why should their understanding and subordination to the pack's 
customs (its praxis) not be regarded as φρόνησις, of some degree? Humans doing the same thing 
surely qualify as having, at least some degree of, φρόνησις for doing so. The rationale for this, 
which Aristotle presents, is that they lack the required extra account of reason that makes those 
beliefs or actions as signs of knowledge and that might be plausible. 
 
This would not have to be a big issue for, of course, one can have the correct view of the world, or 
some particulars, without actually having knowledge. Believing what is actually the case without 
having it qualify as knowledge would not be of any practical significance at all. But what is 
troubling here is that animals are, as a consequence of Aristotle's model, denied the ability for 
having beliefs. For having a belief about something requires conviction, which in turn requires 
reason as well (DA 3.3, 428a19-24). 
 
2.2	  The	  extent	  of	  perceptual	  content	  
How is it even possible to manage without beliefs about the world? How can, for example, a 
running cat avoid an obstacle if one does not believe that one is in front of it? The Aristotelian 
solution to this problem is found in its model of perception. In contrast to Plato, who thought that 
every sense had its proper (ἴδιον) sensibles in the world and that no features of a thing can be 
perceived by more senses than one, Aristotle presented a model where he added common (κοινά) 
qualities. Aristotle’s perceptual model’s ability to grasp multiple sensibles is evident from the 
following: 
 
ἀλλὰ µὴν οὐδὲ τῶν κοινῶν οἷόν τ’ εἶναι αἰσθητήριόν τι ἴδιον, ὧν ἑκάστῃ αἰσθήσει αἰσθανόµεθα 
κατὰ συµβεβηκός, οἷον κινήσεως, στάσεως, σχήµατος, µεγέθους, ἀριθµοῦ· (DA 3.1, 425a14-6) 
 
Neither, however, is there some special sense organ for the common things we perceive 
incidentally by each sense, such as motion, rest, figure, magnitude, number and unity. (Trans. 
Shiffman, 2011) 
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Clearly, this extension of the sensibles does enable a creature to perceive that something is the case, 
which is a sort of propositional account.8 To be able to perceive movement and that something is 
ahead of oneself and is not moving do, for sure, solve the problem with the cat running towards an 
obstacle. This also seems to remove the need for reason, as animals can navigate with such rich 
perceptive abilities, which provide them with all needed information. Aristotle though, recognizes 
that at least some animals have the ability of having post perceptual appearances like memories 
(µνήµη) (Metaph. 1.1, 980a29) and imagination9 (φαντασία). Regarding the ascription of 
imagination and its role the following passages make it all clear: 
 
πολλοὶ γὰρ παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήµην ἀκολουθοῦσι ταῖς φαντασίαις, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις οὐ 
νόησις οὐδὲ λογισµὸς ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ φαντασία. ἄµφω ἄρα ταῦτα κινητικὰ κατὰ τόπον (DA 3.10, 
433a10-3) 
 
In many cases humans follow their imaginations in spite of their knowledge; and in the other 
animals there is no thought or reasoning, but there is imagination. Both these, then, are 
productive of motion with respect to place (Trans. Shiffman, 2011) 
 
ὅλως µὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ᾗ ὀρεκτικὸν τὸ ζῷον, ταύτῃ αὑτοῦ κινητικόν· ὀρεκτικὸν δὲ οὐκ 
ἄνευ φαντασίας· φαντασία δὲ πᾶσα ἢ λογιστικὴ ἢ αἰσθητική. ταύτης µὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα 
µετέχει. (DA 3.10, 433b27-30) 
 
In general, then, as has been said, in the way in which the animal is desiderative, in just such a 
way is it able to move itself; and it is not desiderative without imagination. All imagination is 
either sensory or involves reasoning. The other animals thus have a share in this as well. (Trans. 
Shiffman, 2011) 
 
Non-human animals thus have imagination (φαντασία) and that is what, together with 
appetite/inclination (ὄρεξις), causes them to act. The imagination is, as the above text makes clear, 
divided into two types: a sensory imagination, which has nothing to do with reason; and 
deliberative imagination, where reasoning serves a vital purpose. To illustrate the difference 
between the two sorts of imagination it is worth having a look at Michael Frede's explanation: 
 
                                                
8 This is also noted and stressed by Sorabji (2001, p.17) 
9 This is a tricky term to translate but I will use the most common translation ”imagination”. This is a sort of internal 
perception, which can not only be created by the perception of external objects but also from memory, and could 
very well also be translated as ”perceptual appearance” for example. 
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It obviously is the case, and Aristotle obviously assumes, that animals can perceptually 
discriminate particular objects and kinds of objects, for instance by their characteristic look. But, 
obviously having the look of a tree or the look of a lion is not the same thing as being a tree or 
being a lion. We do not even have to assume that looking like a lion always has to coincide with 
being a lion. Animals still would be able to discriminate lions by their look to the extent that 
looking like a lion and being a lion do coincide. But even when they coincide it is one thing to 
look like a lion and another to be a lion. And the claim is that animals can discriminate lions by 
perceptually discriminating their look, something perceptible, whereas human beings can 
discriminate lions by intellectually discriminating whatever it is such that being that is to be a 
lion, something imperceptible and only accessible to reason and intellect, hence intelligible as 
opposed to perceptible. (Frede, 2008, pp.295-6) 
 
Regarding memory (µνήµη), its connection to perceptions – memory is created out of perceptions – 
gives birth to the interesting result that animals, who many times have a greater perceptive ability 
than humans, might have greater content of memory as well. A somewhat puzzling feature of the 
Aristotelian model is that animals are more or less denied (it seems to be very restricted) the ability 
to create experiences (ἐµπειρία) out of their memories: 
 
τὰ µὲν οὖν ἄλλα ταῖς φαντασίαις ζῇ καὶ ταῖς µνήµαις, ἐµπειρίας δὲ µετέχει µικρόν· τὸ δὲ τῶν 
ἀνθρώπων γένος καὶ τέχνῃ καὶ λογισµοῖς. γίγνεται δ’ ἐκ τῆς µνήµης ἐµπειρία τοῖς 
ἀνθρώποις· αἱ γὰρ πολλαὶ µνῆµαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγµατος µιᾶς ἐµπειρίας δύναµιν ἀποτελοῦσιν. 
(Metaph. 1.1, 980b25-981a1) 
 
The animals other than man live by appearances and memories, and have but little of connected 
experience; but the human race lives also by art and reasonings. Now from memory experience 
is produced in men; for the several memories of the same thing produce finally the capacity for 
a single experience. (Trans. W. D. Ross, 1953) 
 
That animals are only allowed a small extent of experience is rather strange and it is not clear why 
this should be the case as their memories do not seem to be limited at all. Indeed, in the Posterior 
Analytics (2.19, 100a5-6), the process of transforming multiple memories to experiences seem to be 
an automatic one. If reason would be required for the formation of experience from memories, that 
would rule out the whole possibility for animals to have experience, but they actually seem to be 
allowed some experience. How can experience, which is a simplification or summation of 
numerous memories, even be created without some sort of reasoning faculty? There must be a sort 
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of computing device to help out with this sort of operation and what would that be in a creature 
lacking just such a device? Furthermore, when reason is added to post perceptual content, it is when 
experiences are transformed into knowledge/art (τέχνη). 
 
2.3	  Signs	  of	  animal	  intelligence	  in	  Aristotle's	  corpus	  
It is worth noting that there are passages in Aristotle's works where animals seem to be ascribed a 
more favorable amount of intellectual capacities than what is stated above. Earlier in the 
Metaphysics passage quoted above, it is clearly implied that some animals, those with memory, 
have intelligence (φρονιµώτερα) as they have more intelligence than those without memory. 
Animals without the ability to hear sounds are also called intelligent (φρόνιµα) even though they 
lack the ability to learn, as a result from not being able to hear.10  
 
There are other passages where animals are granted intellect by Aristotle. In On the Parts of 
Animals, there is a discussion of what the differing characters of blood in different species 
implicates for the individual. Those with thin and cold blood are claimed to be better off 
intellectually (νοερώτερον) and perceptually even though the best blood for promoting intelligence 
(φρόνησιν) and courage is hot, thin and pure (PA. 2.2, 648a3-11). In Generation of Animals, 
Aristotle even grants animals knowledge (γνῶσίς): 
 
ἀλλὰ περὶ µὲν τούτων ἐν ἑτέροις ἐπέσκεπται, τοῦ δὲ ζῴου οὐ µόνον τὸ γεννῆσαι ἔργον (τοῦτο 
µὲν γὰρ κοῖνον τῶν ζώντων πάντων), ἀλλὰ καὶ γνώσεώς τινος πάντα µετέχουσι, τὰ µὲν 
πλείονος τὰ δ’ ἐλάττονος τὰ δὲ πάµπαν µικρᾶς. αἴσθησιν γὰρ ἔχουσιν, ἡ δ’ αἴσθησις γνῶσίς τις. 
ταύτης δὲ τὸ τίµιον καὶ ἄτιµον πολὺ διαφέρει σκοποῦσι πρὸς φρόνησιν καὶ πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἀψύχων 
γένος. πρὸς µὲν γὰρ τὸ φρονεῖν ὥσπερ οὐδὲν εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ κοινωνεῖν ἁφῆς καὶ γεύσεως µόνον, 
πρὸς δὲ φυτὸν ἢ λίθον θαυµάσιον· ἀγαπητὸν γὰρ ἂν δόξειε καὶ ταύτης τυχεῖν τῆς γνώσεως 
ἀλλὰµὴ κεῖσθαι τεθνεὸς καὶ µὴ ὄν. (GA 1.23, 731a29-b4) 
 
 All animals have, in addition, some measure of knowledge [γνώσεώς] of a sort (some have 
more, some less, some very little indeed), because they have sense-perception,* and sense-
perception is, of course, a sort of knowledge [γνῶσίς]. The value we attach to this knowledge 
varies greatly according as we judge it by the standard of human intelligence [φρόνησιν] or the 
class of lifeless objects. Compared with the intelligence [φρονεῖν] possessed by man, it seems 
as nothing to possess the two senses of touch and taste only ; but compared with entire absence 
                                                
10 Metaph. 1.1, 980a27-980b24 
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of sensibility it seems a very fine thing indeed. (Trans. A.L Peck, 1902) 
 
Though perception is clearly an inferior and lower type of knowledge than φρόνησις, it is 
interesting to see that Aristotle makes a point about the necessity of being aware of what one 
compares a thing to. Browning Cole writes that: 
 
“This may provide us with the interpretative key to the apparent inconsistency in Aristotle's 
views on animal intelligence and character” (1992, p.51) 
 
Although I like the idea, I am not as convinced as she seems to be that there really are troubling 
inconsistencies in Aristotle on this point. Sure, I find it implausible to deny animals that great 
amount of intellect and reason as Aristotle seems to have done, but I do not find his model 
inconsistent. There are some troublesome passages as noted above but considering the fact that 
animals are said to be φρονεῖν, as in the Metaphysics passage above, this does not imply that they 
do have reason. Rather they are acknowledged as having perception and imagination. As for the 
lesser knowledge, perception, it is clear in the text itself that it is a minor ability which is nowhere 
near as good as φρόνησις, so it is not clear what significance that has for the topic at hand. Now, 
animals are surely described, by Aristotle, as inferior to humans with regard to intellectual abilities, 
but as Browning Cole notes: 
 
to fail to reach the highest level is not the same as never to be placed on the scale at all; animals 
clearly here are holding a place on the scale of intellectual abilities (not merely perceptive or 
sensitive abilities). (Browning Cole, 1992, p.49) 
 
Even though Aristotle very well might ascribe some minor intellectual abilities to animals, it is very 
clear that they are considered to be nowhere near to those granted to humans and while insisting 
that this differing grade has to do with different types of reasoning, Aristotle's theory holds. What 
would really make for an inconsistent Aristotle would be to take into account some of the passages 
of his History of Animals. In books 8-9, animals are granted technical knowledge (τεχνικός) and 
thought (διάνοια and νοῦς) but as that work is spurious I have left it out here. More certainty of its 
being of Aristotle's hand would certainly turn the tide into the hands of Browning Cole's 
interpretation. 
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2.4	  Strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  of	  the	  Aristotelian	  model	  
When looking at Aristotle's model as a whole it is actually quite simple. All animals (including 
humans) partake in sense-perception and formation of perceptual images (φαντασία), some are also 
being able to enhance their perceptual images with post perceptual images from memory. This 
enhancement is furthermore able to create experience (ἐµπειρία), which is a summation and a sort 
of rationalization of many particular memories, and this may well be characterized as a kind of 
knowledge. The ἐµπειρία, however, is not classified by Aristotle as knowledge for it lacks a sort of 
rational account, a knowledge of the universal facts that are the actual causes of why the particular 
memories can be unified. As already mentioned above (p.10), though, mere experiences can very 
much be sufficient for being successful in life and that is exactly what Aristotle seems to allow 
animals to reach intellectually. And, as Frede accurately notes: 
 
Aristotle does say that animals cannot think. But by this he does not mean that animals cannot 
have a string of impressions like ‘it is pretty cold’, ‘the light has a certain quality’, ‘it is about 
time to fly south’. In fact this is what Aristotle is attributing to animals when he attributes sense 
(φρόνησις) to them and says (980b26) that they live by their impressions and their memories. 
Aristotle is not denying to animals the bit of what we might call ‘thinking’ which the empiricist 
doctor engages in, because they cannot think. Aristotle has no difficulty whatsoever to accept 
that animals can display extraordinary ingenuity in getting hold of a banana. What Aristotle is 
denying to animals is the power of memory and the rich experience human beings have. And 
what Aristotle is claiming is that this sort of memory and this sort of experience does not yet in 
itself give you the ability to think. What Aristotle is willing to say (De Anima III.10 433a10–12) 
is that one might think of impression as a sort of thought (ὡς νόησίν τινα), but he is denying that 
the impressions of animals are thoughts. (Frede, 2008, p.299) 
 
But since Aristotle, in contrast to Plato, denies that we are born with reason (Posterior Analytics 
2.19), it is legitimate to ask how one can acquire the rational account, that is how can one grasp the 
form (Metaph. 1.1, 981a10) or universal (Metaph. 1.1, 981a16;21) needed for transforming 
experience into τέχνη and ἐπιστήµη. The answer, which is presented in the Posterior Analytics 
(2.19), is that reason evolves from sense-perception at some point, and it is only when one has the 
right concepts of a specific domain that it is possible to gain knowledge. Frede's comments on this 
are, once again, enlightening: 
 
this seems to be an enormously strong assumption. For it amounts to the claim that we can only 
think once we have got all the concepts in terms of which one will know and understand really 
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right. And this does not leave any room for the assumption that thinking must already be 
involved in reaching the state in which we have a grasp of the principles or axioms governing a 
domain, because we have a grasp of the basic items or features constitutive of this domain. 
(Frede, 2008, p.301) 
 
I am not as inclined to see this as a problem, at least not for Aristotle's model, as Frede seems to be. 
There might still be room for inferior sorts of reasonings and all that Aristotle is exploring is our 
potentials. If some humans do not actually think, in Aristotelian terminology, that does not have to 
be a problem, neither to them or to the model as such, providing that they at least have the potential 
of doing so as human beings. What is of bigger interest here for the topic at hand is that the 
Aristotelian definition of  “thinking” that animals are being denied the potential to reach seems to 
be no walk in the park to reach for a human being either. 
 
Resting, as it does, on positing a world of intelligibles, or at least, some possibilities to grasp 
universals intellectually, it is easy to be quite sceptical about the Aristotelian model. If there are no 
such intelligible truths or, perhaps, no way of reaching such things for us, then we cannot be said to 
have the potential of having reason or thinking either. Actually, if that is the case, none of 
Aristotle's sub-lunar beings can think. 
 
Alas, the whole project might seem corrupt from start, for a non-rationalist or an empiricist minded 
reader. In addition to the above, it is worth noting that although the model as such is quite coherent 
within itself, it is a rather implausible method to use for explaining the world when one just posits 
that there are natural differentiae that are also teleological causes and aims. Aristotle, though 
influential during many years, fell out of fashion and is not regarded as the great natural scientist 
that he perhaps was once considered, and that is for a good reason. The reason being that his overall 
teleological worldview is, and has always been, inadequate. 
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3.	  Theophrastus	  
Among the remains of the works of Theophrastus (which by a substantial part are fragmentary), 
there are quite a few hints as to what Theophrastus might have thought. Several sources indicate 
that Theophrastus might have considered animals more akin to men than his teacher Aristotle. 
 
3.1	  De	  abstinentia	  3.25	  
In De abstinentia 3.25, Porphyry reports about Theophrastus' view on kinship (οἰκεῖα) as a ground 
for morality. Theophrastus starts by stressing kinship based on shared ancestors and men living 
together in the same land, then he proceeds to stress kinship based on likeness as grounds for moral 
consideration (this is referred to as an alliance). Theophrastus is then reported to take this line of 
reasoning even further. Alliance between animals is considered strong as many of them show great 
resemblance with each other. Finally, the resemblance between animals and us (humans) are 
recognized and emphasized: 
 
εἰ δὲ ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ λεγόµενον, ὡς ἡ τῶν ἠθῶν γένεσίς ἐστι τοιαύτη, φρονοῦσι µὲν ἅπαντα 
φῦλα, διαφέρουσι δὲ ταῖς ἀγωγαῖς τε καὶ ταῖς τῶν πρώτων κράσεσι, παντάπασιν ἂν οἰκεῖον εἴη 
καὶ συγγενὲς ἡµῖν τὸ τῶν λοιπῶν ζῴων γένος. (De abstinentia 3.25, 30-34) 
 
If it is true that the origin of characteristics is like this, then all species have intelligence, but 
they differ in upbringing and in the mixture of their primary components. The race of other 
animals would then be related and kin to us in all respects (Trans. Clarke, 2000) 
 
The similarities between humans and animals and the rating of which similarities are important – 
namely, the features of the soul – is clear from this passage: 
 
οὕτως δὲ καὶ τοὺς πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἀλλήλοις τίθεµεν καὶ συγγενεῖς, καὶ µὴν <καὶ> 
πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις· αἱ γὰρ τῶν σωµάτων ἀρχαὶ πεφύκασιν αἱ αὐταί· λέγω δὲ οὐκ ἐπὶ τὰ 
στοιχεῖα ἀναφέρων τὰ πρῶτα· ἐκ τούτων µὲν γὰρ καὶ τὰ φυτά· ἀλλ’ οἷον δέρµα, σάρκας 
καὶ τὸ τῶν ὑγρῶν τοῖς ζῴοις σύµφυτον γένος· πολὺ δὲ µᾶλλον τῷ τὰς ἐν αὐτοῖς ψυχὰς 
ἀδιαφόρους πεφυκέναι, λέγω δὴ ταῖς ἐπιθυµίαις καὶ ταῖς ὀργαῖς, ἔτι δὲ τοῖς λογισµοῖς, 
καὶ µάλιστα πάντων ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν. (De abstinentia 3.25, 16-25) 
 
Thus also we posit that all human beings are kin to one another, and moreover to all the animals, 
for the principles of their bodies are naturally the same. I say this not with reference to the 
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primal elements, for plants too are composed of these: I mean, for instance, skin, flesh and the 
kind of fluids that are natural to animals. We posit this the more strongly because the souls of 
animals are no different, I mean in appetite and anger, and also in reasoning and above all in 
perception. (Trans. Clarke, 2000) 
 
The similarities obviously have a lot to do with mental capacities and this is also what primarily 
seems to be the most important difference between animals (including humans) and plants. One can 
note, as Browning Cole does (1992, p.55), a considerable (polemical) divergence from Aristotle 
who denies that humans and animals have anything morally relevant in common (thus, for Aristotle, 
animals are not characterized as moral; cf. NE 8.11 1161a32-b4). 
 
In the passage from De abstinentia 3.25 above it is a striking fact that Theophrastus actually 
mentions reasoning (λογισµός) as one thing we have in common with animals. As we noted above 
Aristotle did write that animals engage in reasoning but that was qualified with ”as if”. Furthermore, 
Aristotle actually denied animals λογισµός in DA (3.10, 433a12) so it is not only possible that 
Aristotle did not actually think animals had the ability of reasoning, but probable, whereas 
Theophrastus more likely thought that animals had a reasoning faculty. 
 
The claim, from the introduction, that Theophrastus acknowledges that animals have reason, of at 
least some degree, is thus strengthened and the chasm between those who have reason and those 
who have not can even more firmly be said to be situated between animals and plants for 
Theophrastus and not, as Aristotle seems to have put it, between humans and non-human animals. 
 
Before putting too much weight on this passage, it is necessary to consider the terms used by 
Aristotle and Theophrastus. Sure, Theophrastus acknowledges that animals have reasonings 
(λογισµός), whereas Aristotle has denied this. However, even if λογισµός might, like λόγος, be 
translated as reasoning, it is important to stress the fact that λογισµός cannot be translated as reason 
(the faculty). Λογισµός is commonly translated and used for calculating and it is quite obvious that 
this is what the individual need for transforming perceptions into memories and especially turning 
memories into experience, which can perhaps be described as unified and sorted memories. One 
must thus be cautious before making too much out of the occurrence of λογισµός here. 
 
While speaking of terminology it is also worth mentioning that animals are characterized as having 
intelligence (φρονοῦσι) in the first quotation from De abstinentia above. Though Aristotle denies 
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φρόνησις (practical wisdom) to animals, he surely describes them as φρονεῖν, which simply means 
that they have sense perception. This is probably what Theophrastus would have meant with 
φρονοῦσι, rather than ascribing them practical wisdom but it is hard to be completely certain. 
 
3.2	  De	  abstinentia	  book	  2	  
Earlier in De abstinentia, Porphyry reports some views from Theophrastus, which are relevant for 
the discussion of the appropriateness of sacrificing animals to the gods. Following a series of stories 
about the origins of animal sacrifice – which is said to be due to ignorance and sometimes dire need 
– Porphyry writes:  
 
εἰκότως ὁ Θεόφραστος ἀπαγορεύει µὴ θύειν τὰ ἔµψυχα τοὺς τῷ ὄντι εὐσεβεῖν ἐθέλοντας (De 
abstinentia 2.11) 
 
Theophrastus was right to forbid the sacrifice of animate creatures by those who wanted to be 
truly pious (Trans. Clarke, 2000). 
 
The rationale for this prohibition is, apart from the stories of erroneous reasonings leading to the 
birth of the custom of animal sacrifice, three-fold: 
 
(i) The fruits of the earth are the most beautiful and honorable things that the gods have given us 
and thus the most appropriate gifts to sacrifice. 
(ii) “we ought to make only those sacrifices by which we hurt no one, for sacrifice, more than 
anything else, must be harmless to everyone.”11 (De abstinentia 2.12, Trans. Clarke, 2000). 
(iii) The animals that are sacrificed are deprived of their lives against their own will and “sacrifice 
is, as its name implies, something holy. But no one is holy who requites a benefit from things which 
are the property of another” (De abstinentia 2.12, Trans. Taylor, 1823). 
 
What is clearly implied in the last argument above is that animals own their own body and future. It 
is not considered appropriate at all to take or dictate over some other individual's life (or death). I 
share Browning Cole's interpretation: 
 
Why are the animals not fairer and nobler qua divine gifts? The answer must be that animals 
                                                
11 One might question whether this is plausible. Is not the whole point with sacrifice that someone is harmed in a way 
for a greater benefit of something or someone(s)? Perhaps the religious sacrifices in question during antiquity were 
different. 
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are not divine gifts to us at all. They are something else, ensouled in their own right, not 
potential fuel for sacred flames. Plants, unlike animals, can be owned. (Browning Cole, 1992, 
p.53)12  
 
This is not only an interesting piece of thought to find within an ancient thinker such as 
Theophrastus, but is something that quite many people probably would consider a fairly modern 
view of animals – it is simply one of the fundamental components of the animal rights movement 
that has been on the rise for the last decades. 
 
As for the question of the mental capacities of animals, it should be a requisite to have some sort of 
agency, conceptions/beliefs and preferences for being able to own something in a meaningful way. 
Thus one can safely ascribe to Theophrastus that he must have thought animals had some of those 
capacities, or at least something similar. It should however be noted that maybe these capacities do 
not necessary require intellect or reason. Perhaps the Aristotelian model, which after all allows 
memories and some experience to animals, can handle this. 
 
Added to the three arguments above, and this can be viewed as empowering the second argument, is 
also the statement that 
 
”soul is much more valuable than that which grows from the earth, so it is not fitting (οὐ 
προσῆκεν) to take it away by sacrificing animals.”13 (De abstinentia 2.12, Trans. Clarke, 2000) 
 
Admittedly, and I mentioned this above, the last statement does seem alien for a Peripatetic to use. 
It should be obvious for all who know their Aristotle, that the conception of soul used here is not 
very compatible with Aristotle's soul (and with it of Theophrastus and of the other Peripatetics). 
Their conception of soul was, as mentioned above (p.6), rather a principle of life and, as such, 
something that all living beings possess – both plants and animals (including humans). 
 
                                                
12 It might be worth noting that this conception of what can be owned, however much I approve of it myself, seems 
not to be the dominant view in our society today and most probably not during Theophrastus' and Porphyry's days 
either. On the contrary, non-human animals are widely conceived as property which can be breeded and treated 
pretty much as we please - including being sold, traded and killed for no other reasons than our own preferences. 
 
13 In order to make this argument more plausible, I think one should add that it is valuable for someone, most fitting 
would be the ”owner” herself, and that would indeed result in a harm inflicted on her to have it sacrificed. If the 
value would be an objective one, that is without it being valuable for someone, it is harder to see the harm inflicted 
if the possessor is not the one that is considered as suffering a loss. 
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A good part of the use of soul here can probably be explained by the fact that Porphyry was a 
Neoplatonist, but one can also note that the very same word ψυχή can be translated as both ”life” 
and ”soul”. It is thus possible that Theophrastus meant life rather than soul and that his words 
changed meaning when they were used in a Neoplatonic context and with Neoplatonic intentions 
with the reception of the text. 
 
It is clear that animals differ quite radically from plants and that the main difference which seems 
relevant here is the capacity to object, or at least have an opposing desire (i.e. not wanting to lose 
one’s life or be sacrificed). Animals must thus have some kind of preferences (by which I simply 
mean that they do not only strive unconsciously toward an end – τέλος). Once again, it is quite 
possible that this can be achieved within Aristotle's model and thus not having to entail reason or an 
intellect in the Aristotelian sense. Aristotle granted animal appetite and as that is an important part 
of their causes of action (movement) they obviously desire to live. Also, Aristotle and Theophrastus 
recognized animals as being sensible/aware (φρονεῖν) to the world, to which they react in 
accordance with their desires. So there is at least consciousness of a kind here, which is not found in 
plants for example. 
 
Even though the Aristotelian model can handle most of the difficulties and challenges raised in the 
passages about animal sacrifice, it is clear that there is a difference between Aristotle and 
Theophrastus regarding the moral status of animals. And this difference does rest on their diverging 
views on animal mental capacities. Whereas Aristotle does not see them as mentally significant 
enough for moral standing, Theophrastus is different. Theophrastus displays features in his thinking 
that very much resemble those which are fundamental to the animal rights movement, that is the 
respect and acknowledgment of the animals' right to not be harmed for no good reason and being 
deprived of its most precious possession – its life. For sure, Theophrastus does not mention such a 
thing as animals having rights, but the reasons for moral consideration is the same and they are all 
relying on seeing animals as living sensitive beings with a mental life resembling, but not being 
equal to, our own. 
 
3.3	  Historia	  plantarum	  
Another passage that might suggest that animals have broader intellectual capacities for 
Theophrastus than Aristotle is found in Historia plantarum. In the opening lines of the first book, 
where some general remarks about plants and the inquiry at hand are made, animals are said to 
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possess characters/conduct and actions (ἔθη and πράξεις) whereas all plants lack this.14 The weight 
of that might not be obvious at first glance, but considering the fact that Aristotle explicitly denies 
actions (πράξεις) to animals (NE 6.2 1139a19-20) – a fact that Theophrastus should have been 
aware of – it is quite plausible that he is here taking a polemical stance towards his teacher. 
 
Granted that Theophrastus shared Aristotle's definition of what an action is or something similar, 
which should not be a too bold assumption, this actually says quite much of the mental powers 
ascribed to animals. For Aristotle, an action originates in a decision and a decision requires desire 
(ὄρεξις) and rational reference to an end (NE 6.2 1139a30-3). The word used for rational is the same 
as for reason – λόγος(!). In the next sentence (NE 6.2 1139a34-5) it is further underlined that 
intellect/mind (νόος) and thought (διάνοια) is required for being able to make a decision. 
 
Thus, given the not at all improbable assumption that Theophrastus shared Aristotle's demand that a 
requisite for action is that one exercises one's intellect/reason his ascription of actions to animals 
implies that they have intellect/reason of at least some degree. 
 
3.4	  De	  causis	  plantarum	  
Before moving on to some difficulties with the presented Theophrastean view, one can mention 
another passage which is of interest for the understanding of Theophrastus' view on animals. In his 
De causis plantarum (2.17.5), Theophrastus comments on plants living entirely situated upon other 
plants: 
 
προσφιλῆ γὰρ δὴ ἀλλήλοις καθάπερ καὶ τὰ ζῶα καὶ τὰ φυτὰ τάχ’ ἂν εἴη (De causis plantarum 
2.17.5) 
 
[Perhaps such plants do this] because they are fond of each other and thus live together, just like 
animals do (Trans. in Browning Cole, 1992, p.57) 
 
Although this is by no means a good account of how plants function, and it were probably not 
meant to be that either, it surely displays something about animals. The adjective used in the 
sentence (προσφιλῆ) is an emotion-term and we can, with the above mentioned arguments and 
passages in mind, therefore ascribe to Theophrastus with increased confidence the view that animal 
associations do have an emotional content. For to be able to have emotions animals must have 
                                                
14 Credit goes to Browning Cole for finding and discussing this passage before me in her article. 
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certain mental abilities, namely desire and some sort of agency. Again, the point is not that the 
Aristotelian model cannot handle this. The point is rather that he perceives, and acknowledges 
animal associations, and I quote Browning Cole here, ”as more than mutual protection societies or 
merely instinctive huddlings” (Browning Cole, 1992, p.57). 
 
3.5	  Inconsistencies	  in	  Theophrastus?	  
As we saw above, there seem to be some problems, especially regarding memory, within the corpus 
of Aristotle and as it turns out this is also the case with the remaining works of Theophrastus. 
 
In a fragment, found in Photius (Fortenbaugh, 1984, p.18-19), Theophrastus discusses whether envy 
or grudgingness can be found in animals. Several examples of behavior that is supposed to show 
animals exhibiting grudgingness toward humans are given and they are refuted as being 
anthropomorphic. Following this, there are two sentences that both label animals as having no 
reason (ἄλογοι): 
 
”For from whence could such wisdom come to unreasoning creatures, which reasoning 
 creatures learn by means of long training?” 
and 
”Many other things are done by unreasoning creatures, of which we do not have it in our 
 power to explain the causes.” (Fortenbaugh, 1984, p.18-19. Trans. in Browning Cole, 1992) 
 
How should these sentences be understood? Does Theophrastus deny emotions (and reason) to 
animals here? This seems unlikely and, as Fortenbaugh has pointed out (Fortenbaugh,1984, p.161), 
animals still seem to be able to feel envy and grudgingness toward other members of their own 
species. What is denied is that they can have such emotions towards humans. It is also quite 
possible that, as Browning Cole points out (1992, p.58), such emotions as envy may be among the 
most complex of emotions. If so, the absence of such emotions does not necessarily rule out the 
possibility of having less complex emotions and with that reason, but of a lesser degree. 
 
No matter the explanation or downplaying of the meaning of those passages, it is still a fact that 
animals are there referred to as ἄλογοι twice. One way of explaining this choice of words is to 
ascribe the reason for their occurrence to Photius rather than Theophrastus.15 It is certainly a 
possibility that these are the words of Photius rather than Theophrastus but there are several options 
                                                
15 This is suggested by W K Kraak. (1953, pp.411-14) 
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of explaining these ἄλογοι that still leaves it open for their origin to be of Theophrastus. 
 
One way is to emphasize the fact that λόγος is also the common word used for speech. That animals 
lack speech do not entail that they lack reason or intellect. Though not an impossible interpretation 
of λόγος this seems to me to be a less likely meaning. Take the first sentence – sure, such wisdom 
can be transferred well in a group of speaking individuals, but how is it that the reasoning creatures 
can only learn such wisdom through long training if they are able to transfer it by way of speech? 
Interpreting λόγος as reason seems more likely here. 
 
Another way, which Browning Cole attempts twice (Browning Cole, 1992, p.59), is to limit the 
scope of λόγος. Firstly, by limiting the ἄλογοι to only deprive animals of being able to be petty. 
This is done by claiming that they are lacking sufficient reasoning power to be able to be malicious 
and petty, i.e. they are simply made innocent. Secondly, by having the ἄλογοι mean that they lack 
just the mental capacities for being able to do the required planning and judgments for an envious 
and/or malicious behavior. I do however find it strange and unconvincing that ἄλογοι would have 
been used in this way, and I cannot think of any occurrence where λόγος has been subject for such 
restricted meanings that are required for the argument to succeed. 
 
Although troublesome, I do not consider those two occurrences of ἄλογοι to undermine the 
suggestion that Theophrastus actually thought that animals have some reasoning capacities. The 
suggested passages in favor for such a view of Theophrastus do have the reason and intellect 
arguments more directly and obviously in favor for such a view, whereas those two mentioned 
passages against simply are not as strong and convincing. 
 
3.6	  Is	  there	  a	  departure	  from	  Aristotle	  in	  Theophrastus?	  
With regard to the above mentioned fragments of Theophrastus' view, one can conclude that it is a 
possibility that Theophrastus diverged from Aristotle's model of cognition. These are by no means 
any conclusive, knock down arguments for this being the case and that Theophrastus granted reason 
to animals. On the contrary it seems rather probable that he did not diverge very far, judging by the 
rather scarce evidence. 
 
However, there are clearly signs of Theophrastus having a far more respectful and generous opinion 
towards animals regarding their mental abilities. They are recognized as being a lot more like 
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humans than in Aristotle and they even qualify for having moral relevance on merit from having 
such close resemblance to us. 
 
It is possible, and probable, that Theophrastus actually shared the general Aristotelian model and 
that the divergence rather is a result of differing emphasis.16 I find that this claim to be at least 
partly strengthened. For whereas Theophrastus stressed and laid emphasis on the human features 
that animals seem to have a share of, and thereby in a way enhancing their moral standing, Aristotle 
seemed to do something similar when he instead stressed and laid emphasis to the features that 
humans have that are common among many animals.17 Aristotle thus can be seen as degrading 
humans to animal status and then add the differentia, thinking/reason, with which the standing of 
humans skyrockets as that is a feature that is only shared by some possible gods. The reason for 
acknowledging Browning Cole's theory of diverging emphasis as only partly strengthened is that it 
is hard to explain the several occurrences where animals are actually credited, or implied to have, a 
greater intellectual ability in Theophrastus view than the animals are allowed in Aristotle’s. 
 
It thus seems plausible that animals are considered to have a bit more reasoning power in 
Theophrastus’ view than in Aristotle’s. Possibly Theophrastus might even have consented to the 
statement that animals’ intelligence do not differ in sort, but rather by grade. That might very well 
be to push it too far, at least there is not sufficient evidence for such a statement available. It is, 
however, obvious that he has taken a few steps in closer to make such a statement coherent with his 
view. 
 
In his biological works, Aristotle is remarkably gradualistic. In On the Parts of Animals, Aristotle 
describes the entities of nature: 
 
Nature passes in a continuous gradation from lifeless things to animals, and on the way there 
are living things which are not actually animals, with the result that one class is so close to the 
next that the difference seems infinitesimal. (PA 4.5 681a11-15. Trans. A.L. Peck) 
 
In a similar vein, the border between man and animals, with regard to temperaments, is explored in 
History of Animals (8.1) so the sharp distinction between man and animals when it comes to reason 
                                                
16 This is suggested by Browning Cole (1992, p. 61) 
17 Catherine Osborn writes: ”His [Aristotle's] outlook stresses the continuity between human and animal behaviour, 
and then seeks the explanation, convinced that there must be, in fact, a way in which animals can act intelligently 
without intellect.” (Osborne, 2009, p.84) 
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and intellect is rather surprising from that perspective. That is also why the Theophrastean approach 
which might emphasize difference in grades, as explored above might be seen as more Aristotelian 
than Aristotle's own in a way.18 As amusing as this might sound, such statement is clearly not taking 
into account the, by Aristotle identified, τέλος of the posited uniquely human treat reason. The 
teleological view of the world is arguably closer to the core of Aristotelianism than the gradualism 
displayed in his biological works. 
 
Recognizing the inconsistencies in Aristotle's corpus, which seems to collide with his denial of 
reason, knowledge and emotion to animals (some of them brought described in section 2.3 above) 
Browning Cole puts forward an interesting thought, which is well worth quoting: 
 
If Aristotle and Theophrastus worked together in a true collaboration, as they must have, then 
the Theophrastean inclination to see similarity and kinship where Aristotle sometimes saw 
blank difference would have been accommodated within the collaboration somehow. Seen in 
this way, the tensions about animal intelligence within the Aristotelian corpus are not disturbing 
discords but may rather provide a fascinating glimpse into what must have been one of the most 
joyous intellectual partnerships in the era, and perhaps of all time. (Browning Cole, 1992, p.61-
2)  
 
If this thought would resemble the truth, and it is not improbable that it really is, Theophrastus 
would not only have provided a more reasonable view on animal intellect, but might also have 
influenced his former master to embrace, at least some of, his ideas as well. 
 
Theophrastus’ view is, provided that it resembles Aristotle's as much as put forward above, close to 
being on par with Aristotle's regarding its plausibility as a model of the soul. The general model is 
pretty much intact and the only real difference seems to be that animals might have more reason 
than Aristotle ascribed to them. This hardly affects the model's plausibility but it is a nice addition, 
which, is a more plausible feature on its own. 
 	  
                                                
18 Browning Cole seems to make more or less the same point when she suggests that Theophrastus ”can be seen as 
carrying Aristotle's own naturalism about intelligence and virtue even further” (1992, p.61). 
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4.	  Concluding	  remarks	  
Theophrastus might have granted reason of some degree to animals but is it not possible to have 
reason and thinking (λόγος/νοῦς) of a lesser degree and thereby being able to grasp just some of the 
intelligibles/forms? For perception this is the case – all animals have differing perceptual abilities 
and some can thereby grasp more information from the world than others. Why cannot reason work 
in the same way? Would not that be even more plausible? Clearly, this raises the question of what 
degree of reason particular species would have but that is way out of scope here. 
 
Related to the above, one can also wonder if there is an important difference at all between the sort 
of (the suggested lesser) reasonings, required to handle memories and produce imagination, and the 
(higher) reasonings required for abstract reasoning? To state that these are two different “things” 
just because there is a difference about what one thinks about seems implausible. Is thinking about 
cooking recipes and thinking about football strategies so different things that they should be said to 
be of different sorts? Imagine, for example, one who is completely ignorant of football and studies 
football games, without information from anyone else, in order to learn what they are doing. Her 
struggle and eventual success will lead to her grasping the idea/form of football (reach a higher 
truth). A coach, on the other hand who studies games of her coming opponent as well as strategies 
excessively and ends up devising a few promising tactics, is not grasping any higher truths. Instead 
what she perhaps grasps is a sort of lesser knowledge – about particulars – needed to best the next 
opponent. Which is the higher reasoning? Is it even a point of making up different names of the 
reasonings, which will affect the way we value them, just because one can? 
 
I think not, and it seems better to talk about one single sort of reasoning (one which compares and 
calculates data) and to explain all differences between species and individuals as differences of 
degree rather than sort. Perhaps this is where Ockham’s razor, mentioned in the introduction, enters? 
There do not seem to be any good reasons for having a lot of different intellects and that is 
something, which ought to be shaved off. Admittedly that does not earn any of the duelists the 
victory here, but Theophrastus is arguably the man who was positing the fewer amounts of 
implausible assumptions, as he at least perceived something close to a gradual difference of reason 
between species rather than supposing differing kinds, when there are no real differences. 
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